Indonesia's Army Fails to Stop Riots

by Andreas Harsono

The employee told his version of events to the people there. And it did not take long before hundreds of people coming out of the terminal -- where drivers, would-be passengers, street vendors and students ordinarily gather -- began to move on the "Rejo Agung" shop.

The mob encircled the store, shouted anti-Chinese remarks, and, as expected, ran amok. Then they jammed a burning tire inside.

"Destroy the Chinese," shouted the mob.

Four hours after the scolding, anti-Chinese sentiment and the economic hardship faced by this small town of nearly 100,000 finally provoked the mob to attack other Chinese-owned businesses.

Looters also ran off with many goods, from rice stocks to cooking oil, from clothes to razor blades. They used Molotov cocktails to burn the Chinese shops in front of the Kebumen market. The riots only began to calm as evening approached, but by the close of Sept. 7 more than 40 Chinese-owned buildings had been burned down -- almost half of the Chinese-owned businesses in Kebumen.

Surprisingly, perhaps, several Chinese shop owners said there was no sign of police or military during the riots. "Only my Javanese neighbors, who helped to extinguish the fire on the roof," said another Chinese shop owner.

"The police station is actually located in front of the Rejo Agung shop," said student Jhony Purwono, who helps his parents staff a small street vending operation, adding that the police did nothing to prevent the rioters from burning nearly the whole town down.

Many military observers said the reputation of the Indonesian armed forces ("Abri") has never been worse than it is today.

A notorious human rights record, a deep involvement in business activities and dangerous engagement in dirty political operations during the Suharto rule has seriously damaged its once-proud name.

"The Indonesian people mostly regard military personnel as criminals or armed hoodlums, but they do not dare express such feelings openly," said Hermawan Sulistiyo, a political researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

Meanwhile, both the military and the police, which are organized under the Abri structure, have been shown to lack the expertise and the ability to maintain order. A joke circulated among Jakarta's elite is that Abri has expertise in many fields, from business to politics -- but not on military issues.

A government-sponsored team formed to investigate the May riots in Jakarta has recently uncovered a similar problem. Friction between the army and the police were so deep, the commission learned, that the Jakarta police withdrew their troops from the riot-hit areas.

Communications, particularly by radio, also broke down. Commanders then became autonomous islands of authority, or lack of same; most soldiers did nothing as they watched looters burn down Chinese-owned shops, banks, and houses, or even when they robbed the Chinese shop owners right in front of them.

Worse than that, instead of guarding strategic places, army commanders busied themselves guarding business sites or rich housing areas where the owners could offer larger payments.

Jakarta and Kebumen were just two examples. Today's Indonesia witnesses riots on a variety of scales on an almost daily basis. From oil-rich Lhokseumawe in northern Sumatra to Baucau in East Timor, near Australian waters, riots and looting have helped to destabilize the world's fourth most populous country.

Opposition leader Amien Rais warned that further riots and looting might bring Indonesia to the brink of disintegration, saying that the military should reform itself and go back to the barrack if it wants to stop the disintegration.

Within four hours, theoretically, the Kebumen security forces could ask for a larger force from military barracks in two neighboring towns 30 minutes to a 2-hour drive away.

"We're totally outnumbered," said a police spokesman, ignoring the reality that security forces everywhere in the world are almost always outnumbered when dealing with riots.

The unspoken reason for their hesitation is that most soldiers here are badly demoralized. Their commanders do not know what to do when facing rioters. If they open fire, they are afraid that it might end up with their dismissal or even imprisonment.

The looters knew very well that those soldiers were nervous and would never take firmer measures. It is true that soldiers and police officers here are not well trained to use riot-control approaches.

During Suharto's rule, soldiers often used repressive measures such as using live ammunition, torturing key witnesses, or kidnapping human rights activists

Recent revelations in the press have told of tortures, killings, kidnappings and rapes involving Indonesian soldiers in the politically-troubled Aceh province of northern Sumatra and the internationally-disputed East Timor; both have also seriously tarnished the reputation of the Indonesian army.

Muslim protesters have also repeatedly urged the government to reopen its investigation into the Tanjung Priok massacre, in 1984 when more than 150 Muslims were allegedlly killed.

A fresh investigation is very likely to corner several retired military figures, including former a vice president and former Abri commander.

Foreign diplomats and analysts here also said that many young frustrated officers, who prefer to concentrate their energy to their security professions rather than the day-to-day politics, are also annoyed at Wiranto who is widely seen not firm enough to distance himself from the old practices of the Suharto regime.

Wiranto told a parliamentary hearing in mid-September that Abri musti keep its "dual function" role, which -- under the law -- gives the military a a wide role in the country's socio-political life besides its more traditional role in defense.