Kosovo Could be "Second Vietnam," Warn Soviet Vets

by Sergei Blagov

The might of the Soviet Air Force failed to overcome guerrillas in Afghanistan and the United States knows only too well that its massive air superiority in Vietnam was not enough to win the war.

There could be a "second Vietnam -- this time very close to all of us, inside Europe," warned Russian defense minister Igor Sergeyev, in referring to the crisis over Yugoslavia.

Russian veterans of the Vietnam conflict agreed. "The Americans and NATO are too arrogant just because they have not encountered any strong resistance in recent years," said Nikolai Kolesnik, head of Russian Vietnam War Veterans Union. "We would not let them get away with it."

Between 1965 and 1973 a total of some 22,000 Soviet military experts went to Vietnam, most of them as air defense personnel. Some of them took part in combat and 18 Soviets were killed in action.

Their job was to protect the sky over North Vietnam as the United States waged the greatest air war in history, lasting in varying degrees of intensity from 1961 until 1972. Estimates of the tonnage of the ordnance dropped on all of Southeast Asia, vary from 8 to 15 million tons, compared to some 3 million tons of bombs dropped by allied forces in the European, North African and Asian theatres of World War II.

The SAMs obviously were not advanced compared to the technology in U.S. planes, retired general Mark Vorobyov, senior Soviet military expert in charge of missile modernization in 1967 and 1969, told IPS.

"However, they worked -- as the factor of surprise seemed decisive," Vorobyov declared.

The first SAMs were located in April 1965 by the Americans, and on July 24, SAM ground to air missiles were fired at four U.S. Phantoms over Vietnam, shooting down three. This marked the first time that U.S. planes are attacked by surface to air missiles.

Russian veterans described the tactics of the first engagement as "missile ambushes" -- the U.S. pilots did not expect any danger and flew at medium altitudes of 3-4 km, constituting an ideal target for missiles. In one particular combat engagement in 1965 in Ninh Binh --Thanh Hoa area a Soviet crew under colonel Ivan Proskurin downed 4 warplanes by 3 missiles.

"Missile ambushes" proved to be a good tactic, said Alexander Krylov, a radar engineer in Vietnam between 1966 - 67. The idea was to set up dummy sites where small bombs were detonated to imitate launches -- precisely at the same time as an actual launch a distance away -- so that planes would target the wrong launch site.

News from Yugoslavia would indicate history seems to be repeating itself. NATO commanders have admitted they are puzzled that one of the SAM systems inherited from the Soviet Union had been fired up for days.

A member of the Russian general Staff, Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, believes the latter. He is convinced that, despite massive strikes, Yugoslavia's air defense system remains virtually intact.

Russian veterans also argue that current tactics of Yugoslav military to move around and hide their missiles complexes is the only right option.

During the Vietnam war they raised camouflage and concealment of missiles to a high art. The SAMs moved around and some sites were equipped with dummy missiles to disguise their locations. A policy of rapid site movement and dummy construction by the North Vietnamese posed problems as American pilots never knew exactly when to expect a SAM attack.

Attack or threatened attack by MiGs and SAMs often forced U.S. pilots to abort their missions. Often planes responded to the presence of SAMs by simply not attacking certain areas.

"Of course, American pilots were afraid of our missiles and they often jettisoned their ordnance up to 30 kilometres away from the designed target," Kolesnik said. "It's no big wonder NATO warplanes unload their cruise missiles out of reach of Yugoslav air defenses."

Missile effectiveness plummeted due to U.S. attacks with anti- radiation missiles, which home in on radar signals. When U.S. aircraft did locate SAM sites in Vietnam, they attacked them with anti-radiation missiles, Kolesnik recalled.

To cope with it, missile crews turned their radars on and off or did not activate the SAM terminal guidance radar until some 10 seconds before launch, which denied warning to U.S. pilots from their radar homing and warning equipment, he said.

"Noticing the launch of anti-radiation missiles, we just turned our radars off, which impaired the accuracy of U.S. missiles and protected our crews against attack," Kolesnik said.

Even the greatest of concentrated air attacks, when U.S. planes threw everything short of nuclear weapons at North Vietnam, the bombing failed to force the North Vietnamese to accept U.S. terms of peace deal.

"Air strikes are not going to accomplish their goals in Yugoslavia," Kolesnik maintained.