NATO Involvement Just Beginning

Analysis by Jim Lobe

The most important questions are:

• How to contain Albanian Kosovars' desire for independence;

• How to prevent Milosevic, now an indicted war criminal, from stirring up new conflicts;

• How to follow through on vague pledges to rebuild the battered economies and infrastructure of the southern Balkans.

All these questions assume that the peace plan will be implemented smoothly -- an assumption which most U.S. and independent analysts here are not yet prepared to make.

"I will feel much better about this when we have evidence that there is a real withdrawal of Serb forces (from Kosovo), and when we're moving in," President Bill Clinton said June 4, in a typical cautious remark.

Indeed, much remains to be hammered out, and analysts stressed that Milosevic, always a wily tactician, never hesitated to take advantage of loopholes in past agreements.

If agreement is achieved to NATO's satisfaction, however, the alliance will then find it has to keep the peace -- and that could be difficult, according to analysts.

The KLA now has many more thousands of recruits than it did when the air campaign began and it always has sought complete independence for Kosovo. It grudgingly agreed to a provision in the Rambouillet Accord, which was rejected by Milosevic, that left open the possibility of a referendum on independence after three years.

Under the new plan, Yugoslavia's sovereignty over Kosovo is re-affirmed, and Albanian Kosovars, who constituted roughly 90 percent of the province's population one year ago, are offered only autonomy within the Yugoslav federation.

Moreover, the plan requires the demilitarization of the KLA, a task which NATO peacekeepers presumably would carry out.

The KLA's often-divided leadership spans the political spectrum. While it has made no official statement on events of the past two days, few analysts believe the KLA is satisfied with the peace plan.

"It is difficult to see how the Kosovars will ever again accept Serb rule or sovereignty over Kosovo after 1.4 million of them were forcefully expelled and many tens of thousands were murdered," said Ivo Daalder, a Balkans specialist at the Brookings Institution, a Washington thinktank.

"It is clear that the (KLA) will actively -- perhaps even violently -- oppose any settlement that rules out independence."

Yet, NATO has signed onto an accord which requires the KLA not only to give up their dreams of independence from Yugoslavia (although they are guaranteed autonomy under a UN-led interim administration for now), but also to lay down their weapons.

"When the smoke clears, I doubt the KLA will be satisfied," said Julianne Smith, an analyst at with the British-American Security Information Center (BASIC).

That prospect clearly worries U.S. policymakers who also are concerned over the future of Milosevic and internal Yugoslav politics.

U.S. officials hoped -- long before the Kosovo war -- that most Yugoslavs would come to see Milosevic's reign as ruinous to their country and oust him from power. That hope endures, particularly in light of the massive destruction caused to country's infrastructure by NATO warplanes.

But despite a 10-year record of major reversals -- which has seen the piece-by-piece dismantling of the former Yugoslav nation -- Milosevic has managed to hang on, often creating new crises around which to rally public opinion and distract his people from focusing on past defeats.

"Strife is mother's milk to Milosevic," said David Rieff, a Balkans specialist at the World Policy Institute, a progressive thinktank in New York.

Rieff wrote in the Wall Street Journal June 4, Milosovic could try to further destabilize his political foes in Montenegro or crack down against minorities in Sanjak or Vojvodina which, like Kosovo, he deprived of autonomy in 1989.

Even if Milosevic is ousted -- a result which many officials and analysts like Rieff favor -- there is no guarantee that his successor will be better.

Officials worry that ultra-nationalist groups, such Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj, could actually bolster their influence in Belgrade in the wake of Yugoslavia's defeat.

Seselj, whose party voted against the plan in the Yugoslav parliament, said he will resign from office if the deployment of NATO troops goes forward. "They will not feel safe in Kosovo," he said, suggesting that NATO may encounter armed Serb resistance.

To induce the estimated 1.4 million Kosovar Albanians who were forced to flee their homes to return, NATO, as the main occupying power, faces a huge challenge.

Most of the province has been depopulated; entire Albanian villages and neighborhoods have been looted, burned, and destroyed. "It's as if we will have to start from scratch, with building materials, seeds, tractors, livestock, everything -- and in a very short time," said one State Department official.

Moreover, Kosovo's status under the peace plan -- as an autonomous province of Yugoslavia -- may preclude it from receiving assistance from multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which have become increasingly proficient in rushing aid to war-devastated countries.

One major debate which has already broken out here and in Europe is whether Yugoslavia should receive any assistance while Milosevic remains in power.

The problem with withholding help from Serbia not only risks strengthening revanchist forces in Belgrade, but also will hurt neighboring economies which are closely linked to Serbia's.