Timor Slaughter May Signal Indonesian Army Coup

by Kafil Yamin

Defense Minister and armed forces chief Gen Wiranto is often pointed to as the leader with real power, especially given the subject of East Timor these days, though he denied talk of a coup as "baseless."

But far from an outright military coup that unseats Habibie or has him quit, analysts say that the president is likely to sit out the next two months before a new president is chosen -- but with not much real, significant power.

A "silent coup" is how the local press and analysts call it, others describe it as a "bloodless coup" that might well already have occurred for all intents and purposes.

Many Indonesians believe the military would not risk an open power grab. Besides, others add, the students that took to the streets to demand Suharto's resignation last year would not take this one this sitting down.

"In Indonesia, a naked power takeover will be too vulgar to see. If they (the military) have to, they will do it in subtle manner," said Amien Rais, chairman of the opposition National Mandate Party.

"TNI (the Indonesian acronym for the military) won't be willing to harm its image in the eyes of the community," he added.

In any case, an official in the State Secretariat said, "(The end of) Habibie's term is only two months ahead. Besides, many will be angry if he does not stand before MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) to account for his gross mistakes." He added: "So, Habibie's immediate resignation will even make things worse in the near future."

The acquiescence of the military, like that of influential Muslim leaders, was key in persuading Suharto to quit in May 1998 amid angry public protests, and in allowing his then vice president, Habibie, to assume the presidency.

The military's role in political life is also enshrined in the Constitution, so that it has allotted seats in the country's legislative body.

Today, the armed forces' role has in focus again as the Habibie government has been unable to control the attacks by armed pro- Jakarta militia, which witnesses say are aided by the Indonesian military in East Timor.

The Cabinet turned down a proposal by Wiranto for the imposition of martial law on Monday, but the military chief went to Habibie, who then issued a presidential decree to that effect.

"He had to adjust to the military's request for imposing martial law on East Timor," observed Marzuki Darusman of the National Commission on Human Rights and a deputy chairman of the ruling party Golkar.

Rumours of a coup included talk that Habibie would be forced to quit by the military, and a presidium consisting of Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Justice Minister Muladi, and Wiranto would temporarily run the government.

To many, it indicated that the military had in fact been calling the shots on East Timor, being tenaciously opposed to accepting, much less inviting, foreign troops into the territory where thousands of soldiers had died in carrying out military operations.

Rallies have been held here in the past days by the families and kin of Indonesian soldiers, along with veterans themselves, who disagree with Habibie's policy of giving East Timor the option of independence.

The protesters flew the Indonesian flag at half-staff in their housing complex here, called 'Seroja' after the name the military gave to its operation to 'take' East Timor and to defeat the separatist rebellion there.

"What is the meaning of our sacrifice? And what is the meaning of our medals?" one veteran asked, reflecting the depth of feeling stoked among some in the military by East Timor's vote.

Habibie reportedly consulted little before he announced willingness to let East Timor vote, a move that was received well overseas but displeased the military which had virtually ruled the territory under Suharto's rule.

The differences between Habibie and Wiranto can hardly be dismissed, said Lt Gen Bambang Triantoro, former chief of staff of the socio- politics of the military. "The problem in Aceh and East Timor strongly indicate such odds," he said, referring to areas that had separatist sentiment.

Still, others say the political equation was not as simple and that even Wiranto is not in full control of the military.

Several middle-ranking officers, who got promotions from assignments in East Timor, are known to be less loyal to him. This group includes Col Noer Moeis, commander of Udayana Military command and Maj Gen Adam Damiri. Moeis has just been removed from top post of the East Timor military command.

Past military operations in East Timor have cultivated in these officers a deep emotional link with the local militias, which the military in the eighties turned to arming to fight the Fretilin resistance forces in their territory.

For the same reason, these middle-ranking officers are affiliated with senior retired generals who were involved in the process of 'integration' in 1975 to 1977, the early years when Indonesia tried to assert military control over East Timor after Portugal pulled out.

Among these generals are Beny Moerdani, Try Sutrisno, Theo Syafi'e, and Edy Sudradjat, political analysts here say. "The senior generals do not have the heart to see East Timor separated from Indonesia. Several middle-ranking officials share their feeling," said an analyst who asked for anonymity.

The Jakarta Post earlier quoted Theo, now with the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, as supporting the entry of foreign peacekeepers because the military's history in East Timor is too "emotional" for it to be neutral under a martial-law situation.

Theories abound as to why the military cannot or will not stop the bloodbath in East Timor and carry out its duty to protect its population. Similar questions surround the real aim of the militia -- whether to partition East Timor, drive most of its people out, or just sack the territory.

Meantime, more worrying reports from East Timor are coming in. After taking contol of Dili, members of the Integration Fighter Forces (PPI) militia, led by Eurico Guetteres, are now infiltrating West Timor, where tens of thousands of refugees have taken shelter.

There, they launched a sweeping operation in Kupang to Atambua in the hunt for pro-independence elements. News reports say four members of the Council of National Resistance (CNRT) were killed during this campaign, including one CNRT commander, Jose da Costa alias Maududu.