Angry World Asks: What Happened to "Clinton Doctrine?"

Analysis by Jim Lobe

These ringing words came from President Bill Clinton while addressing NATO troops in Macedonia, in the wake of the U.S.-led NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia after Serbia's repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, less than six months ago.

His remarks formed part of the evolving doctrine of "humanitarian intervention," used by Western powers since the end of the Cold War, to justify military action against sovereign states to protect the human rights of their citizens.

Breathtakingly sweeping as a principle, Clinton's statement appeared to commit the United States, if not NATO, to taking unilateral -- if necessary -- military action if, by doing so, it could stop massive human rights abuses in other sovereign nations.

Coming in the wake of Clinton's apology to Rwanda for failing to act to prevent the 1994 genocide there, the Kosovo precedent was hailed by many as a major advance in the quest to universalize human rights and make their protection enforceable by all states.

So it was only natural that, among the most-asked questions around the world during the mayhem sparked by Indonesian army-backed militias in East Timor after the Aug 30 independence referendum, was: What about the Clinton Doctrine?

The point was echoed in the South Korean newspaper Joong-Ang Ilbo.

"Last March," it said in an editorial, "the United States declared a so-called 'new internationalism,' under which America insisted human rights supersedes sovereignty. "The same America and the UN, however, are just watching the bloodshed in East Timor... "The United States is taking a totally different position in just five months."

Indeed, the initial response from Washington to the violence that engulfed East Timor after the referendum was undeniably lame. Despite reports of a "scorched-earth" strategy -- in which hundreds of people were being killed and tens of thousands forcibly displaced by the militias and the Indonesian army -- top officials made clear that Washington did not want be involved.

"The United States cannot be and should not be, viewed as the policeman of the world," declared a laconic Defense Secretary, William Cohen, just 24 hours after Jakarta declared a state of military emergency and promised to get the situation under control.

"Because we bombed in Kosovo doesn't mean we should bomb Dili" (the capital of East Timor) added Sandy Berger, Clinton's national security adviser who went on to compare the situation with telling his daughter to "clean up her room," an analogy for which he later apologized.

Such remarks, however, provoked angry reaction in the united States as well as abroad.

A rising chorus of both Republican and Democratic lawmakers -- just back from a monthlong recess -- voiced growing exasperation with the Clinton administration for failing to act more forcefully, even though most of them were opposed to unilateral military intervention.

"How does the so-called Clinton Doctrine apply to East Timor?" asked the Republican chairman of the House International Relations Committee. "Is there a double standard for Europe and the rest of the world?"

"We apologize for Rwanda for letting one million innocents die; we apologize for Guatemala after condoning the brutal murders of even U.S. citizens... When will we apologize for East Timor; when it is too late?" said Rep. Cynthia McKinney, a Georgia Democrat.

Administration officials, faced with these questions as well as a clamor in Congress to enact far-reaching sanctions against Indonesia and the IMF if it continued its financial bailout of Jakarta, now admit that their initial public statements fell far short of what was needed.

"Privately, we were quite tough, especially with (the armed forces chief, Gen.) Wiranto," said one administration official. "The Pentagon kept insisting that we had to give the (Indonesian) army a chance to restore order as Wiranto had promised. So we didn't want to tear into them publicly until it was clear that he either couldn't or wouldn't."

While acknowledging parallels with Kosovo, officials stressed that Washington never considered taking unilateral military action in Timor. They believed this would not only have provoked a fierce nationalist backlash in Indonesia, but also would have confirmed China's worst fears of U.S. global aspirations, coming after the Kosovo crisis.

They also noted that Washington lacked a regional military organization, like NATO in Europe, to give it a multilateral mandate.

"There ain't no NATO in East Timor," said Sen. Joe Biden, the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"We encouraged statements by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank that put the Indonesians on notice that they could lose everything unless they played ball," said one State Department official. "I don't think they've ever linked their actions to a political situation as much as they did in this case."

Ultimately, however, Washington will always tailor its actions to specific circumstances, regardless of the breadth of Clinton's rhetorical commitment to humanitarian intervention, U.S. officials and independent analysts here said.

"I for one would love to see the civilized global community have the power to do (actions like Kosovo) everywhere," said Rep. Tom Lantos, chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. "But being a realist, I recognize that it can do it only in very few places where very unique circumstances prevail."

"U.S. policymakers can give serious weight to humanitarian principles," wrote Richard Feinberg, a former Clinton national security aide, in the Los Angeles Times, "but the ultimate course of action will be contingent upon a variety of interests and tactical considerations."